- > What the above attitudes and behaviors all have in common is that they are deviations from accepted methods for learning and growth.
All Highlights
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- > Overidentification with the work. So when it goes well, you’re on the top of the world, but when it goes badly (which a perfectionist think is always happening) you’re down in the dumps. This is an exhausting cycle at best; at worst it can terrorize you away from your work. Also, seeing your work as a justification, vindication, legitimization, or other personal validation.
Page 2 - > Grandiosity. Perfectionists think that things that are hard, or even impossible, for other people should be easy for them. This leads to all kind of antiproductive behaviors, including a lack of interest in planning, lack of willingness to consult mentors, and attempts to work without adequate resources.
These traits all certainly add up to perfectionism, but they likely present at different levels in everybody, leading to a variety of different types of perfectionism among different spectra.
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- > once the fabricated object leaves the factory, there is the way in which it will design the actions of its users, according to the inherent delimitations of how it can be used â here we can think of equipment, appliances and other functional objects as having âhorizons of useâ,
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- > We have already encountered the hermeneutic circle â in the example of using a machine tool wherein knowledge comes to be inscribed by being with the âdesigning-beingâ of the tool, this in turn modifying the being of the tool user. To complete this circle a third step is added â interpretation â in which the âdesigned beingâ of the user acts back upon the tool or the material being worked on, with the effect of modifying or improving the process. This ushers in the possibility of learning and change. In general terms, the hermeneutic circle is a way of explaining a structural condition of being-in-the-world. It operates in all kinds of situations, from everyday coping to more formal acts of interpretation such as historical enquiry or the reading of literary texts, which is where it first surfaced as a philosophical concern. As we have seen, Heidegger gives primacy to the significance of Daseinâs pre-ontological understanding of things â the understandings that come from being-with-things and with others rather than from introspection or from conscious acts of interpretation. Yet the commonsense model, inherited from traditional philosophy, is that interpretation comes before understanding, that it is the means toward understanding. Heidegger reverses this: âAny interpretation which is to contribute to understanding, must already have understood what is to be interpretedâ.15
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- > If your answer to Question 1 is yes and your answer to Question 2 is âsampleâ, you need ICC(2). In SPSS, this is called âTwo-Way Random.â Unlike ICC(1), this ICC assumes that the variance of the raters is only adding noise to the estimate of the ratees, and that mean rater error = 0. Or in other words, while a particular rater might rate Ratee 1 high and Ratee 2 low, it should all even out across many raters. Like ICC(1), it assumes a random effects model for raters, but it explicitly models this effect â you can sort of think of it like âcontrolling for rater effectsâ when producing an estimate of reliability. If you have the same raters for each case, this is generally the model to go with. This will always be larger than ICC(1) and is represented in SPSS as âTwo-Way Randomâ because 1) it models both an effect of rater and of ratee (i.e. two effects) and 2) assumes both are drawn randomly from larger populations (i.e. a random effects model).
Page 3 - > After youâve determined which kind of ICC you need, there is a second decision to be made: are you interested in the reliability of a single rater, or of their mean? If youâre coding for research, youâre probably going to use the mean rating.
Page 4 - > We add â,kâ to the ICC rating when looking at means, or â,1â when looking at the reliability of single raters.
Page 4 - > After youâve determined which specificity you need, the third decision is to figure out whether you need a measure of absolute agreement or consistency.
Page 4 - > If using a mean [ICC(#, k)], consistency is typically fine, especially for coding tasks, as mean differences between raters wonât affect subsequent analyses on that data.
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- > Teachers were not optimistic that the IP reforms would lead to gains in student outcomes. In the three districts, typically less than 50 percent of teachers agreed that, in the long run, students would ben- efit from the teacher-evaluation system, and that percentage declined over the course of the reform.
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- > If you look at a forest from far enough away, it can appear to be a single, unified whole. But this is a misperception, and in fact there is nothing more there than the
Page 3 - > trees that make up the forest.
Page 3 - > the analogy is a false one, because atoms, unlike the trees that make up a forest, are not observable. In the case of the forest, it makes sense to say that we are really perceiving trees, and simply mistaking them for some larger whole. We do, after all, really see the trees. But in the case of an object like a pot, it does not make sense to say that we are really perceiving atoms, and simply mistake them for a pot.
Page 3 - > wholes have causal powers and properties that are irreducible to the sum of the powers and properties of the parts.
Page 3 - > Uddyotakara illustrates this idea by noting that âyarn is different from the cloth made from it, since the two have different causal capacitiesâ (p. 107).
Page 3 - > He also argues that yarn must be different from the cloth made from it insofar as the former is a cause of the latter (Ibid.). And he distinguishes this cause from the clothâs âother causes,â such as âthe weaverâs loom.â
Page 3 - > Here we might seem to have an implicit distinction between what Aristotelians call material cause (the yarn) and efficient cause (the weaverâs loom). But NyaĚya-VaisĚesĚŁika speaks of a thingâs âinherence causeâ rather than material cause, i.e. that in which the qualities of the composite inhere. And the notion of an inherence cause is broader than that of material cause, since it can include things other than matter (e.g. a location).
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- > Billable rates, estimates and other features are defined on the project level.
Page 1 - > Can be associated with multiple projects.
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- > Cognitive load theory is the idea, first published by Sweller in 1988, that instructional design should focus on not overloading a learnerâs mental effort when designing instruction. âLearning is hampered when working memory capacity is exceeded in a learning taskâ (de Jong, 2009).
Page 2 - > Germane cognitive load â This is the on-task mental âloadâ or activity during learning. This can and should be influenced by the instructional designer. If one defines learning as schema acquisition and building, the âgermaneâ cognitive load is that which contributes to such schema acquisition, and the âextraneousâ cognitive load is that which does not.
Page 2 - > As soon as I first read about germane cognitive load (good) in 1998 vs. extraneous cognitive load (bad), cognitive load theory became unfalsifiable in my opinion. You can justify any experimental result after the fact by labeling stuff that hurts performance as extraneous and the stuff that didnât as germane.
Page 2 - > Canât distinguish between germane and extraneous cognitive load. Related to the above â one canât objectively and before the fact tell whether something will be germane or not. Sometimes something that induces extraneous load may also induce germane load and vice versa. The type of load is highly dependent on learner characteristics and learning objectives (Moreno, 2009).
Page 3 - > So is cognitive load theory a failure or wrong? Is that important? Like I said, the question is a joke. From one perspective Newtonâs laws are wrong and were superseded by Einsteinâs theories, but of course Newtonâs laws are still quite useful and correct enough for everyday scenarios. The more important question is whether a theory is useful, or is there a better, more useful theory.
Page 4 - > I believe an area of future interest should be in exploring how post-cognitive theories may provide more useful explanations for some of the phenomena uncovered by cognitive load theory research. Kaptelinin and Nardi describe some post-cognitive theories in chapter 9 of their book Acting with Technology. Unfortunately, chapter 9 was taken down from the First Monday site for some reason. But the four theories they compare include activity theory, phenomenology, distributed cognition, and actor network theory.